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One of the most controversial social policy issues that remains underdiscussed in scholarly literature is the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities. Th is population has faced a double set of confl icting prejudices: on one hand, people with disabilities are infantilized (as not being capable of having the same range of sexual desires, needs and expectations as persons without disabilities), and on the other hand, this population is demonized (as being hypersexual, unable to control primitive urges). Although attitudes about the capabilities of persons with disabilities are changing for the better, attitudes toward persons with disabilities engaging in sexual behavior have remained fi rmly in place for centuries. However, the ratifi cation of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) demands we reconsider these attitudes.

Th is paper will (1) review the history of how legal and social issues regarding sexuality have been ignored and trivialized by policy makers and the general public; (2) highlight sections of the CRPD that force us to reconsider the scope of this issue; (3) off er suggestions as to how states must change domestic policy to comport with CRPD mandates; and (4) consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence insights for the resolution of these issues.
I. Introduction
O ne of the most controversial social policy issues that remains dramatically under-discussed in scholarly literature is the sexual autonomy of persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, especially those who are institutionalized. Th is population -always marginalized and stigmatized -has traditionally faced a double set of confl icting prejudices: on one hand, people with disabilities are infantilized (as not being capable of having the same range of sexual A portion of this paper was presented (by MLP) at the Biennial Congress of the International Academy of Law and Mental Health, July 2013, Amsterdam, Th e Netherlands. Th e authors wish to thank Dr. Maya Sabatello for her sharing of Israeli source materials.
desires, needs and expectations as persons without disabilities), and on the other hand, this population is demonized (as being hypersexual, unable to control base or primitive urges).
1 Although attitudes about the abilities and capabilities of persons with disabilities are changing for the better, it remains true that, "many people still struggle to accept that mentally d isabled individuals engage in s exual activity."
2 Even as the "sexual revolution" in the United States recognized sex and sexuality were needs rather than simply desires, persons with disabilities were left out of this shift in perception.
3 Attitudes toward persons with disabilities engaging in related to interpersonal relationships, 9 and services in the area of sexual and reproductive health, 10 it is time for a radical change of perspective and attitude in how society views the sexuality, and right to express that sexuality, of persons with disabilities. Following the approach already adopted in international law, society as a whole must recognize that " [b] eing deemed a 'person' or sexual is not contingent upon ability."
11 Yet, the literature surrounding the sexual autonomy and issues of sexuality that people with disabilities continue to confront remains remarkably silent on this issue in general, 12 and totally silent about the issue we discuss in this paper: the CRPD's impact on the rights to sexual autonomy for persons institutionalized because of psychosocial or intellectual disability.
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Th is subject is particularly nettlesome in light of another reality. One of the authors (MLP) has spent over 40 years involved with mental disability law as a legal practitioner, advocate, academic and scholar. Th e other author (AJL) has just embarked on her career as a lawyer on behalf of these populations. Th rough our careers, one thing has been clear. Nothing has ever touched as raw of a nerve as our discussion concerning whether persons with mental disabilities have a right to voluntary sexual interaction, especially when such individuals are institutionalized. 14 Why is this? And how does this relate to "sanism" -an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause and are refl ected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry 15 -that permeates all aspects of mental disability law and aff ects all participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact fi nders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. 16 
Consider this conclusion:
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs of the mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as possessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the imposition of special protections and 14. For a discussion of hostile audience reaction to presentations about this topic, see limitations on their sexual behavior to stop them from acting on these "primitive" urges. By focusing on alleged "diff erentness," we deny their basic humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual needs. By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow ourselves to censor their feelings and their actions. By denying their ability to show love and aff ection, we justify this disparate treatment.
17
Th e foregoing observation may best explain the diffi culty so many of us have in dealing with the question of the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities, and explains why policymakers are often unable to approach such issues thoughtfully, even-handedly, and with clear heads. Th ere is no question that Dr. Julie Tennille's observation -"individuals with mental health conditions face additional obstacles to exploring their sexuality and forging satisfying intimate relationships" 18 -must be "center stage" for this entire investigation. We must accept the reality that virtually all people are "sexual beings."
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Th is paper will (1) briefl y review the history of how signifi cant legal and social issues regarding sexuality have been ignored and trivialized by legislators, policy makers, and the general public; (2) highlight those sections of the CRPD that force us to reconsider the scope of this issue; (3) off er some suggestions as to how ratifying and signatory states must change domestic policy so as to comport with CRPD mandates; and (4) consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence insights for the resolution of these issues. 21 Th e standard "take" on the song is that it is "the bridge between his [Dylan's] end-of-relationships blues and his giddy poetic streaks." 22 Yet, consider these lines in the context of the arguments we make in this paper:
She sat with a baby heavy on her knee Yet spoke of life most free from slavery and To you I had no words to say My experience was limited and underfed You were talking while I hid and Drifting in and out of lifetimes Unmentionable by name. 23 We believe that there is a deep "fi t" between these lyrics, the song's title, and the points we seek to make in this paper. Persons with disabilities seeking sexual autonomy are in a kind of emotional and physiological "slavery"; their experiences are certainly "limited and underfed," and what they wish for is seen, by so many, as "unmentionable by name." Th e idea that persons with disabilities can love and be loved is a "four letter word" to many. We use this lyric here to stress the sadness of that reality. 
What is Meant by "Sex"?
Twenty years ago, one of the authors (MLP) noted:
We must consider whether any of these answers depends upon our defi nition of sex. take into account the realities that "sex" means much more than simply heterosexual intercourse. Although an exhaustive discussion of all permutations is not possible here, we will discuss briefl y the question of sexual-contact-other-than-"standard"-intercourse, the surprisingly nettlesome issue of masturbation, and the most controversial question of compensated sexual assistance.
i. Other kinds of Sex
A recent article -about a civil law suit that followed litigation over a long-term relationship between a man with a psychosocial disability (schizophrenia) and a priest with AIDS -questions whether sex can be ordered like a "Guttman scale," 26 involving a "unidimensional behavioral hierarchy from French kissing to penetrative intercourse," 27 and wonders if "someone has consented to touching genitals over clothing … implies consent to French kissing," 28 asking whether "consent to one step automatically insure[s] consent to others below it?" 29 Th is article does not begin to answer the preceding question, but the perspective of ordering is raised here to clarify that sex and sexual activities are not "unidimensional" questions, and that policymakers should be aware of the complexity of these issues.
With non-normative sexual behaviour (including sexual activities engaged in with and without a partner) come other discriminatory beliefs by the majority of society that sub-cultures practicing such behaviours are "diff erent" and "abnormal." While there are many variations of sexual behaviour, we will briefl y examine the issues surrounding masturbation 
ii. Masturbation 30
Although at least one study has found that staff workers at a mediumsecurity facility for persons with intellectual disabilities generally held "liberal attitudes" toward masturbation, 31 and another article has called for "masturbation training," 32 much controversy swirls around the question of facilitated masturbation and the role of the caregiver in the facilitation process. 33 It goes without saying that this is an issue that must iii.
Care Workers
Perhaps the most controversial question -in a sea of controversial questions -is the appropriateness of using care workers as sexual surrogates in cases involving persons with disabilities. Such surrogacy can involve masturbation or intercourse. 35 Several European nations -including Th e Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerlandallow "limited 'touching' services for [persons with severe disabilities] through non-profi t organizations." 36 Elsewhere, there are organizations in Canada, 37 Australia, 38 Japan, 39 and New Zealand, 40 that, in the words of the Australian-based Touching Base website, "developed out of the need to assist people with disability and sex workers to connect with each other, focusing on access, discrimination, human rights and legal issues and the attitudinal barriers that these two marginalised communities can face." 41 An administrative decision in Denmark has approved the payment of social welfare funding for an "escort girl" as a "handicap benefi t." prohibit prostitution should carve out narrow exceptions for individuals whose physical or mental disabilities make sexual relationships with noncompensated adults either impossible or highly unlikely." 43 Although there is at least one report of this having been done using Social Security funds in the USA, 44 it is clearly an idea that has not gained signifi cant traction in that jurisdiction. In fact, any such use of sexual surrogacy has been sharply criticized as "distort[ing] sympathies for the situations of people with d isabilities to promote p rostitution." 45 Th is question, out of all those that arise when looking at sexual autonomy for persons with disabilities, is compounded by societal views about prostitution, exacerbated by the often-sanist thinking about the sexual needs of persons with disabilities. 46 It is not surprising to see that nations that have legalized the profession of sex worker are more likely to have opportunities for sexual surrogacy. 47 Th ese nations are allowing some of the stigma surrounding sex (and in particular, sex for people with disabilities) to be lifted, leading to a more honest discussion about meeting the basic needs of people, including the need for sex.
Sexual surrogacy also challenges society to imagine that a non-disabled person would be willing to engage in sexual activity with a disabled person. Entrenched sanism and long-standing fear of "contamination" or 43 disability as a "contagion" also make this concept a diffi cult one to grasp for many who may be confronted with this form of sexuality.
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Although surrogacy is not identical to engaging in an emotional relationship in which sex is a component, it is yet another option for people with disabilities to gain some autonomy in their decision making about their own needs. Under the CRPD, they have the same right to engage in sex that non-disabled people do, 49 and surrogacy may aff ord an opportunity to those people who are, for many reasons, unable to or uninterested in engaging in a non-surrogate sexual relationship.
Th e diff erences between nations' views on the "acceptability" of masturbation and sexual surrogacy are also indicative of those nations' dominant norms and values. Professor Elaine Craig has discussed the danger of regulating activity based on the dominant norms of a society, stating that if legal standards are applied based only on dominant belief systems, they "[privilege] dominant social, cultural and religious practices." 50 Further, in the context of consent laws, she notes that "[s]ocial approval is not an equitable basis upon which to criminalize particular sexual activities." 51 Although the disability rights movement has made great strides, persons with disabilities continue to remain a minority group, rather than a part of the dominant culture in most nations. 52 
B. Current Laws Relating to Sexual Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities
As noted previously, discussion of sexual autonomy relating to persons with disabilities are few and far between in scholarly journals. In the United States, the law has followed this trend, with very little attention paid to the legal rights of persons with disabilities to exercise their autonomy, especially in an institutional setting. Many critical questions remain unanswered in the law, leaving hospitals and community treatment facilities to decide for themselves how to best deal with these issues. Often, these decisions are made with no clear guidelines and carried out on a case-by-case basis. Remarkably, none of the respondents questioned in a British study were even aware that they had any "sexual rights." 54 And we virtually never consider the argument posited by the medical ethicist Jacob Appel in this context that sexual pleasure is a fundamental human right. ("[p]oliticizing sexual pleasure and oppression of disabled people through enacting cripsex is a powerful way to affi rm our humanity," where author defi nes "cripsex" to "express the political nature of the sexuality of disabled people" at 16). Compare Di Nucci, supra note 43 at 160 (responding to Appel, and disagreeing with this thesis, in large part, because, if Appel's theory was to be adopted, "we would end up with a situation in which severely disabled people have their sexual satisfaction paid for them by the state, while everybody else will have to pay for it, or go through the trouble of fi nding willing non-compensated sexual partners"). the right to refuse medication, 57 and the right to be treated in the least restrictive environment, 58 to name but a few. 59 Th e number of cases litigated by persons with disabilities has grown exponentially since the 1970s. 60 However, the right to sexual autonomy has remained an elusive topic, with very few references to it in any major state or federal court decision involving persons with disabilities.
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Legislation has also failed to adequately address issues of sexual autonomy both in and out of mental health facilities. A case may be made for regulations or laws allowing sexual activity in certain settings based on domestic disability anti-discrimination laws. If sexual activity is banned for no other reason than the "disabled" status of the consenting adults wishing to engage in such activity, it may be argued that this sort of per se discrimination violates the Americans with Disabilities Act or other similar pieces of legislation. circumstances, entering into a new sexual relationship can be stressful and confusing. Are these stresses "inappropriately" exacerbated when the universe in question is that of institutionalized mental patients? To what extent should the diff ering stress management abilities of institutionalized individuals be factored into any policy ultimately adopted? Conversely, can preoccupation with sex systemically distort all matters involving ward behaviour? How does this focus aff ect questions of individual versus group needs? Might an excessive concern with sex blunt the consideration of other related issues, such as self-esteem, the importance of developing a full range of interpersonal relationships, and the ability to deal with intimacy? We impose signifi cant barriers that prevent institutionalized persons with mental disabilities from establishing intimacy. 64 Yet, one study showed that most patients in high-security hospitals "valu[ed] being in a caring relationship [while] in the hospital," 65 and that there was likely "an ongoing desire for intimacy regardless of gender, diagnosis or off ense group." 66 A closed institution, by its nature, places substantial limits on individuals' mobility and freedom of action. In considering how best to allow individuals to express their autonomy, it is important to consider all aspects of a relationship, including issues indirectly raised by sexual intimacy. For example, when people in the "free world" terminate a 
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C. Th e Eff ects of Institutionalization on Persons with Disabilities and Sexual Autonomy
67 Th ese are decisions that must be considered in order to allow individuals confi ned in an institution the ability to engage in a relationship just as they would in the "free world." Although an institution may need to restrict some privileges based on safety or treatment concerns, it will be critical for institutions to consider a "least restrictive environment" approach when dealing with patients' sexual autonomy, as it is undoubtedly part of their rights under the CRPD.
Another series of issues to consider comes from diff erences in the status of institutionalized persons.
68 Th ose institutionalized after being civilly committed, ordered confi ned for a competency evaluation, or held in a locked facility after a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity each have rights and aspects of law that are unique to each particular status. Assuming the individuals wishing to engage in sexual activity are competent to consent, 69 are all patients to be treated in the same way, or are there diff erences between voluntarily and involuntarily committed 67 
D. Clinical Questions Regarding Sexual Autonomy of Persons with Disabilities
Next, we must consider clinical questions. A patient's treatment team is charged with fi nding the most therapeutic treatment in the least restrictive environment. For many patients, this involves therapy intended to help them transition back to living in the "real world." Th at can include behavioural therapy and group programs that encourage social interaction. Questions of sexual autonomy should also be considered within that context in developing and assessing a treatment plan and long-term goals for a patient both in and out of a treatment facility. For example, clinicians should note whether the patient in question ever expressed any wish to engage in sexual activity, and then discuss whether it is clinically benefi cial or anti-therapeutic to allow institutionalized patients autonomy in sexual decision-making. 70 Th ese questions also lead to a consideration of patient sexual autonomy from the perspective of hospital offi cials, and the reasons for their discomfort with the subject. Why are hospital administrators resistant to expanded sexual activity on the part of patients? Is it more than simple inconvenience, or even the fear of unwanted pregnancies? How much does a fear of a potential hospital-wide AIDS epidemic contribute to this resistance? 74 How realistic and genuine is this fear? Th e expansion of provider liability is the source of realistic concerns on the part of therapists that an ever-expanding range of clinical decisions may lead to ever-expanding personal liability. 75 One commentator has suggested that the threat of litigation has led hospital administrators to "attempt to minimize the complexity of patient sexuality by focusing on the symbolic, simplistic reassurance of written procedures." 76 Was this response idiosyncratic to the circumstances at a particular hospital, or is this practice more common? Professor Bernadette McSherry and Professor Margaret Somerville note on this point:
[E]ven if a written policy on sexual activity is put in place, the fear of litigation by institution administrators may still lead to the "policing" of such activity in case some form of harm may be taking place. Th e threat of litigation may therefore lead to staff members erring on the side of caution in relation to sexual activity among those in institutions.
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E. Cultural Issues Surrounding Sexual Autonomy of Institutionalized Patients
Th e nature of this topic makes it, inevitably, a contentious point among the various groups that will debate it, legislate it, and implement it.
Beliefs and values beyond law and legislation are intertwined with attitudes toward sexual activity. Culture, politics, religion, and senses of "morality" are all elements that must be addressed in order to realistically work through these diffi cult issues and come to a consensus on the proper way to address them. Even if policies are promulgated to protect and respect the sexual autonomy of institutionalized individuals, what happens when individual line staff at a hospital, the people to whom the implementation of the policy inevitably falls, simply refuse to cooperate with the policy because their own sense of religious "morality" forbids it? 78 For example, their religion may teach that unmarried persons -of 
F. Conclusion
Th e issues discussed above should underscore the point that this topic is complex and under-considered in the literature and laws regarding persons with disabilities. 80 Th ese complexities are compounded by society's generally irrational attitudes towards persons with mental disabilities.
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Th e lack of attention, litigation, and commentary on this subject appears anomalous. Institutionalized persons self-evidently do not lose their sexuality or sexual desires when they lose their liberty. Th ere is some added irony to be found in the fact that litigation over antipsychotic medication refusal -the most contentious aspect of institutionalized patients' rights law -centers on drug side eff ects, and the loss of sexual desire is one of the most highly-noted amongst them. acknowledges that sexual desire of a person in need of medication is a suffi ciently important personal trait so that its diminution must be weighed into the formulation of a medication refusal policy. Yet the law simultaneously denies patients the power and importance of sexual desire with respect to hospital ward life.
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Most states do not recognize a patient's right to personal or interpersonal sexual relationships. In practice, a patient's right to sexual interaction often depends on the whim of line-level staff or on whether such interaction is seen as a feature of the patient's treatment plan. It has even been suggested that "sexual activity between psychiatric inpatients should be strictly prohibited and when it occurs patients should be isolated … and tranquilized if necessary."
84 One hospital's guidelines counsel patients as follows: "[i]f you develop a relationship with another patient, staff will get together with you to help decide whether this relationship is benefi cial or detrimental to you." 85 Hospital staff are often hostile to the idea that patients may be sexually active in any way. behaviourists now recognize that patients "are and wish to be sexually active," 87 and that sexual freedom often has therapeutic value. 88 Writing about this recently, Andreas Dimopoulos has argued forcefully that, "[b]y seeking to avoid harm to self we are perpetuating oppressive social and legal responses which presented persons with disabilities as asexual, or worse still, as individuals who should be asexual." 89 Others call attention to our societal obligation to provide family planning assistance to women institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals. 90 Nonetheless, many hospitals remain reluctant to promulgate such policies. Th is is not surprising, given the aforementioned paucity of legal authority requiring them to do so. Moreover, there is a near complete lack of literature generally available to guide hospitals and their staff , should they even desire to formulate such procedures.
Th ere is little case law on the questions addressed in this paper. Of the few litigated cases, the most important is Foy v Greenblott. 91 Th ere, an institutionalized patient and her infant child (conceived and born while the mother was a patient in a locked psychiatric ward) sued the mother's treating doctor for his failure to either maintain proper supervision over her so as to prevent her from having sex or to provide her with contraceptive devices and/or sexual counseling.
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Th e Court rejected the plaintiff 's claims of improper supervision, fi nding that institutionalized patients had a right to engage in voluntary sexual relations as an aspect of either the "least restrictive environment" or "reasonably non-restrictive confi nement conditions" and that that right (to less or reasonably non-restrictive confi nement) included suitable opportunities for the patient's interactions with members of the opposite sex. 93 On the other hand, the Court did characterize the defendant's failure to provide the plaintiff with contraceptive devices and counseling as a deprivation of her right to reproductive choice. 94 It also rejected a claim for "wrongful birth" by the infant child, concluding that "[o]ur society has repudiated the proposition that mental patients will necessarily beget unhealthy, inferior or otherwise undesirable children if permitted to reproduce." 95 While Foy has been applauded as "a model exposition of the reproductive rights of institutionalized women," 96 it is an isolated case. A reading of the case law reveals that this area simply does not exist as an active area of patients' rights litigation. At the same time, there is little in the way of legislation. By way of example, although many American jurisdictions have enacted "patients' bills of rights" providing a broad array of civil rights and liberties for persons institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals, only a few jurisdictions mandate a limited right to sexual interaction. 98 In general, the lack of statutory authority and case law logically leads to the next question: since we are, by all accounts, a fairly litigious group of people, why not? Why hasn't this area -one that deals with the most personal of rights 99 -been the subject of greater scrutiny or of court decrees (or even of substantial scholarly writings)?
100 Although there has there has been virtually no "carryover" to the question of the legal implications of the policies for clinicians (or lack of policies). 102 And, of course, our attitudes exhibit willful blindness to the reality that patients are -and likely always have been -sexually active. 103 We also need to consider how we set priorities in defi ning the underlying question of how we, as a society, can restructure our laws regarding the autonomy of individuals with disabilities to engage in sexual activities of their choice. What do we look at fi rst: autonomy rights, civil libertarian concerns, due process requirements, privacy interests, competency criteria, clinical needs, therapeutic jurisprudential concerns, tort liability worries, voluntariness constructs, or the immutable fact that sexual interaction, by its very description, entails the participation of more than one individual? No resolution of the underlying issues can be contemplated unless we distinguish these approaches and carefully exual activity in institutional settings is more common than outsiders might imagine, and runs that gamut from mutual and supportive relationships between patients through exploitation, coercion, and rape by other patients and staff " at 800).
articulate their interrelationships, their potential confl icts, and their relative values as competing social choices. In short, this is a very diffi cult project.
III. Other Approaches
A.
International Human Rights
Scholars have begun in recent years to focus more carefully and thoughtfully on the relationship between mental disability law and international human rights law. 104 In our own writing, we have explored this connection in the context of forensic facility conditions, correctional law, appointment of counsel, psychological evaluations in criminal cases, and how the law shames and humiliates persons with mental disabilities. We believe that the ratifi cation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities demands that society and legislators alike reconsider this entire issue. First, the CRPD mandates nations to "[p]rovide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or aff ordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and population-based public health programmes."
106 Beyond that, the other Convention Articles referred to above speak to dignity, the absence of discrimination, and the provision of sexual/reproductive health services.
107 Th e Convention goes further than most legislation and court decisions, directly addressing not only the freedom to engage in sex, but outcomes of sexual activity, by codifying the disabled person's right to form a family, right to information and services for sexual health, and notably, the right to "retain their fertility on an equal basis with others."
108 Yet, even given the specifi c and detailed language of the CRPD, the literature has been remarkably silent on these issues in general, especially as they relate to the CRPD's impact on the rights of persons institutionalized due to psychosocial or intellectual disability, to sexual autonomy. 109 Articles 2 (one of the "reasonable accommodation" articles), 23, and 26, Sabatello concludes that the CRPD provides a "possible venue to further advance a right to found a family through "assisted reproductive technologies." 114 In assessing the drafting process, Sabatello notes how all conversations about sexuality "raised acute debates," 115 and that, as a result, sexuality per se "was not elevated to a right." 116 Schaaf -who frontally notes that disabled sexuality is often perceived as a "threat to others" 117 -discussed the "tension" that underlay the negotiations leading to the adoption of the CRPD "between eff orts to promote sexual rights and eff orts to protect PWDs [persons with disabilities] from unwanted sterilization."
118 Further, Schaaf notes that disability-focused NGOs "continue to be reluctant to engage sexuality,"
119 but concludes that "[s]exual rights as a rubric of rights' claiming will likely continue to grow, providing greater and better opportunities to move beyond current understandings of sexual citizenship to include disabled and all other bodies." 120 Professor Michael Stein and Professor Janet Lord have written eloquently about how another Article in the convention -Article 30, setting out social rights of participation in cultural life -"serves as a vital channel of engagement with society when such participation is embraced by the community," and increases "self-reliance and empowerment."
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Other commentators have concluded that the Convention "is regarded as having fi nally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national aff airs on an equal basis with other minority groups who have achieved specifi c treaty recognition and protection." 122 Th e CRPD Committee has already begun to outline legislation and policies required to ensure implementation, a process that may prove useful in addressing the many unanswered questions posed in this paper. Th e Committee has worked on issuing recommendations for services and programs aimed at people with disabilities to assist them in informed decision-making, regardless of whether they are institutionalized or not. 123 Th ese programs would work on mainstreaming disability issues into legislation, and disseminating information about sexual and reproductive health in an accessible format for individuals who want to become informed about their right to engage in sexual activity. 124 Further, the Committee supports teaching sexual health to children with intellectual disabilities. 125 If the Convention is taken seriously -if it is, in fact, more than a "paper victory"
126 -then, perhaps, it can be a vehicle to uproot that aspect of sanism that continues to deny the institutionalized persons the rights to their own sexuality. 127 Th roughout the CRPD, it is apparent that the preferences and decisions of persons with disabilities must be respected and promoted. Expanding on this idea of self-determination, it follows that decisions about sex, sexuality, and reproduction are to be made by the person with a disability, rather than a "caretaker" or a facility superintendent. Th is kind of decision-making is a core element of self-determination and empowerment that is promoted by the CRPD. 128 However, in order to bring about such a dramatic shift in thinking (and translating that to concrete action which will allow for such decisions to be made by persons with disabilities) on this issue, it is necessary that other scholars follow the lead of Professors Sabatello and Schaaf to seriously engage this topic.
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B. Th erapeutic Jurisprudence
Another important lens through which to view this issue is that of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). Th erapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 130 and focuses on the law's infl uence on emotional life and psychological well-being. 131 It suggests that "law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."
132 Th e ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyers' roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential, while refraining from subordination of due process principles. 133 Th ere is an
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity. 138 Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs" as voice, validation, and voluntariness, 139 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifi cally, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that aff ects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 140 Th e question to be addressed here is this: given the way we deny the sexuality rights of persons with disabilities, is it remotely possible that Professor Ronner's vision -of voice, voluntariness and validation -will be fulfi lled? In a thoughtful analysis of the underlying issues, Professor Julie Tennille has listed multiple benefi ts of a "communicative climate" for consumers with regard to sexuality issues. 141 Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant have also used a therapeutic jurisprudential fi lter in weighing these issues. 142 Both commentators have considered how to defi ne "capacity to consent" 143 and "engage in sexual activities," 144 and how to ensure that such defi nitions remain person-centered and allow for a "situational approach" 145 to each case. Th ey write: "incapacity can and should be defi ned situationally -in a functional manner that maximizes [a person's] sexual self-determination."
146 However, Benedet and Grant's thoughtful analysis and emphasis on the individual and his or her self-determination -two concepts linked with dignity -have not been greatly expanded upon in case law or legislation so as to give life to the therapeutic jurisprudential lens that they employ to view these issues of sexuality.
Twenty years ago, one of us (MLP) wrote the following about sexuality issues in the domestic context, and we believe that little has changed in the intervening two decades:
We must also question the therapeutic or antitherapeutic implications of offi cial hospital policies that control the place, manner, and frequency with which such individuals can have sexual interactions. We must consider the implications of these policies on ward life and their implications for patients' post-hospital lives. Th ese questions are diffi cult ones, but we must ask them nonetheless if we wish to formulate a thoughtful, comprehensive response to the wide range of questions this subject raises.
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How does this all "fi t" with the CRPD? We believe that the Convention "is a document that resonates with TJ values," 148 and that it refl ects the three principles articulated by Professor Ronner -voice, validation and voluntariness, 149 by looking at law "as it actually impacts people's lives."
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Each section of the CRPD empowers persons with mental disabilities, and one of the major aims of TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those 152 enforcement of the CRPD serves that enforcement role in the way that persons with mental disabilities are treated with regard to their sexual being. If a TJ perspective is adopted, that will also be the best way to ensure that the sanism that pervades the law's treatment of persons with mental disabilities on questions of sexuality and sexual expression is rooted out of the system. 153 If institutionalized persons with mental disabilities are granted the same sexual autonomy that the rest of us have, the former population will be given a voice. If persons with mental disabilities are allowed voluntary sexual interaction, that, by defi nition, provides the sort of participatory experience that leads to a sense of voluntariness within a therapeutic jurisprudence framework. And together, the grant of sexual autonomy and the concomitant right to voluntary sexual interaction help increase the self-validation of those in question.
We hope that scholars and advocates take seriously the intersection between sexuality issues, TJ issues and human rights issues, and turn their attention more fully to this question in future years.
IV. Conclusion
As society in general becomes increasingly open and direct about sex and sexuality, " [a] ided by the values of a consumer culture and encouraged by the growing visibility of sex in the public realm, many now regard sexual pleasure as a legitimate component of their lives." 154 Th is openness and directness must be allowed to extend to persons with disabilities if full equality for this population is to be achieved. Given the lack of statutory authority, case law, and scholarly articles within this topic, we can only off er conclusions based on our beliefs on the rights of persons with disabilities to their sexual autonomy. Th ere is minimal research to analyze, few statutes to interpret, and few articles to debate; rather, we must rely on the school of thought that upholds equality in every aspect of life for persons with disabilities. Th e CRPD and the guidelines of therapeutic jurisprudence off er us a starting point from which to off er recommendations for scholars, lawmakers, clinicians, and those with mental disabilities.
First, sexual issues must be seen as multi-textured, and the meaning of "sex" must be carefully defi ned.
Second, we ignore cultural attitudes at our own risk. Th ird, many of the critical issues -behavioural, legal, social, and political -remained unanswered, in large part because of the taboos that surround this entire area of law, policy, and social inquiry. Th is all remains very under-discussed because we are still so astonishingly uncomfortable thinking about the questions at hand. We desire to close our eyes to the reality that persons with mental disabilities are sexual beings, and close our minds to the fact that their sexuality may be much more like "ours" than it is diff erent.
Fourth, the UN Convention -fi nally -forces us to reconsider how myopic we continue to be about these issues, and realize that sexuality rights are rights that must be enforced.
Fifth, application of a therapeutic jurisprudence lens to this question forces us to confront how the core principles of TJ are regularly disregarded in our social responses to these issues, and that the three V's articulated by Professor Ronner are rarely, if ever, honoured.
Sixth, the use of the TJ fi lter -in the context of the articulated principles of international human rights law -off ers us a means of approaching these questions in a new and, potentially, socially redemptive way, and in a way that, optimally, erases sanist attitudes.
In Love Is Just a Four-Letter Word, Bob Dylan characterizes love, in the context of the relationship about which he is singing as "unmentionable by name." 155 Love and sex have forever been "unmentionable by name" when we discuss persons with mental disabilities, especially those who are institutionalized, notwithstanding the revolutions that we have seen in the past four decades: sexual revolutions, civil rights revolutions, and disability rights revolutions. 156 And these issues -in the context of this paper -have become even more pointed in the years since the international human rights movement and the mental disability law movement have been joined, and the CRPD ratifi ed. 157 Perhaps, now, we can fi nally devote to this area of law and policy the attention it deserves.
